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Foreword 
In writing this paper I have examined the initial reaction 
of Virginia's leaders to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
the Brown v. Board of Education suit. My study begins with 
announcement of the decision on May 17, 1954. As the weeks 
passed on the Commonwealth of Virginia gradually changed her 
course, experimented with expedients, and set her mind on the 
course of resistance. The General Assembly proved this fact 
by adopting the Resolution of Interposition on February 1,1956. 
A natural termination date for the ~aper is reached at this 
point. 
Throughout the paper there has been no effort to examine 
the major events of the integration struggle in Virginia. The 
only reference to these events is made to illustrate the courses 
of action taken by the leaders of Virginia. 
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Chapter 1 
Virginia's Initial Reaction 
With the announcement of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, a trauma descended upon the 
South--a trauma that was to rekindle old sentiments of animosity 
and distrust. The decision delivered on May 17, 1954, was one 
of the first of many "civil rights" decisions which would 
change a way of life in the South. Of these decisions the 
Brown pronouncement caused the most widespread reactions, for 
it struck at the very heart of "Jim Crow-ism"--segregation in 
education--when it stated that " ••• in the field of public 
education the doctrine of !separate but equal' has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal •••• 11 1 
Virginia, like many other southern and western states as 
well,2 had operated the public s'Qb.ool system under the doctrine 
of "separate but equal." This concept was legally blessed 
in 1896 when the U.S. Supreme Court used the term in the Plessy Y.!.. 
Ferguson case. In that case the Court held that segregation 
laws were legitimate as an exercise of the police power of a 
state.3 Indeed, the Virginia State Constitution of 1901 directly 
stated that "white and colored children shall not be taught 
in the same sbhool. 114 
Previous cases decided by the Court had forbidden segre-
gation in interstate transportation and had attacked some public 
educational institutions as being separate but unequal. Because 
of these decisions, the nation had expected the Bro\'fil decision 
in time; but its actual pronouncement was no less a shock to 
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the South. Reaction to it varied to some degree among southern 
leaders, but in general the tone of their first statements was 
mild. Even within Virginia the character of statements made 
by public officials varied. 
Dr. Dowell J. Howard, the Superi!l;]endent of Public 
Instruction, reflected the general tenor of Virginia's leader-
ship in May of 1954: "\Ve are trying to teach school children 
the law of the land and we will abide by it. Virginia has 
always taken care of her problems, and I think she still has 
that ability. n5 Virginia Attorney-General J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., 
foresaw a rational approach to the problem, and Governor Thomas 
B. Stanley plarmed to call public officials toge~her to find 
a solution acceptable to the citizens and to the Court as well.6 
Public reaction at first reflected to a great extent the 
reaction of the state officials. The Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
Virginia's major newspaper, called for a "calm and unhysterical 
appraisal of the situation. 117 Even Richmond's News:.,.Leader, 
which later took a most extreme position, counselled moderation 
as well as resistance in May.8 Indeed, the initial reaction 
of the South as a whole was much less severe than might have 
been expected. Within a few weeks, however, the Times-Dispatch 
was to move away from this position as were the leaders of the 
Commonwealth. 
In retrospect there seems to have been an inaccurate 
reflection of Virginia's real attitude in the statements of 
public officials in May. Perhaps the bitterness that was: simmering 
below the surface was more accurately reflected by the student 
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newspaper of the University of Virginia: " ••• we feel that 
the people of the South are justified in their bitterness con-
cerning the decision. To many people this decision is contrary 
to a way of life and violates the way in which they have 
thought since 1619."9 Few newspapers openly expressed such 
feelings during the days immediately following the decision, 
unless such expressions were hidden in counsel for patience. 
U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd's thought, for many years a 
fairly accurate reflection of Virginia's official opinion, was 
blunt. The Court's ruling was to him the most serious blow 
that had been struck againsttthe rights of the statea.10 Byrd 
was one of the South's moat highly-respected leaders, and his 
opinions in most matters commanded great influence. His 
popularity among southerners was reflected by his many nominations 
as a regional favorite-son candidate for the Presidency. In 
the integration controversy Byrd's sentiments were to rule the 
day in Virginia's answer to the Brown decii.sion. 
Virgina's "explosion" was a type of delayed reaction, 
and there was ample reason for this de~ay. The Court had 
specifically postponed the implementation of the decision _until 
arguments concerning the method of application could be heard 
from the states affected. This provision gave the southern 
states some hope that their segregated system might be main-
tained more or less intact. Leading constitutional lawyers 
had stated again and again that the Court was obligated to allow 
each state to devise the means for implementation of the decision 
within its borders.11 
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When United States Attorney-General Fl• iawne 81111>: invited 
the southern governors to discuss with him the legal courses 
open to their states, many Virginians gained more hope that a 
satisfactory solution could be found. Only three states, how-
ever, accepted this invitation--Mississippi, Virginia, and 
Florida--and even then (May 22, 1954) Virginia was still leading 
the way toward compliance. h'ven the NAACP felt that Virginia 
could be expected to readjust in an "amicable fashion. 11 12 
The effort to find a solution to the problem was no 
doubt sincere. For many dacades the white, Protestant, Anglo-
Saxon had felt secure in the United States, especially in the 
South;13 and the Brown decision came to be seen as a threat 
to that security. A former governor of Virginia had even 
warned his state to be on guard against "the mongrelization 
of our Anglo-Saxon stock. 11 14 The Anglo-Saxon population of 
Virginia is perhaps as concentrated as in any southern state, 
and such a concentration is especially noticeable in the 
Southside and Tidewater counties--the areas of Virginia with 
the highest Negro population as well. In 1949 V.O. Key, Jr., 
an authority on the political issues of the day, characterized 
~irginia's politics as being oriented around the race issue, 
as was the political situation of every other southern state. 
His words became especially applicable in the 1950's: "The 
race issue broadly defined thus must be considered as the 
number one problem on the southern agenda. Lacking a solution 
for it, all else fails. 11 15 Virginia's emphasis now turned 
completely to the race issue; and no matter how trivial, every 
issue seemed to be considered in light of that question. 
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Resentment to the Brown decision grew, and its growth can 
be attributed to many causes. Legal minds rejected the intro-
duction of sociological and psychological evidence as a be.Sis 
for the decision. 16 The feeling that the decision was to some 
extent based on political considerations encouraged bitterness. 17 
The obsession that the North was imposing its will oni¥1 unwilling 
COt\Str~a~•~~ 
but helpless South gave a sense of despair to the~people.1 8 
These opinions, whether real or imagined, at first created 
a sense of hopelessness. Then blatant defiance arose. Virginia 
saw herself as the leader of the South, and the South gained 
a greater sectional awareness than at any time since Recon-
struction. 19 In August the Governor appointed a group to 
study the situation. From then on, Virginia moved rapidly from 
compliance to defiance, an attitude which would have nation-
wide effects. This reaction, at times termed "the gravest 
Constitutional crisis since the Civil War, 11 20 was south-wide; 
but Virginia's prestige among southern states gave her ac~ions 
great influence among her neighbors to the South.21 
-6-
Chapter 2 
Changing Opinions 
By the fall of 1954 Virginia was apparently steering a 
course far from that forecast by Dr. Howard in May which stated 
specifically that there would be no defiance of the Supreme 
Court decision.22 Although Virginia's leaders repeatedly 
affirmed the Commonwealth's intention to abidecby the law of 
the land, they nevertheless embarked on a policy of delay and 
resistance--a plan which was to be carried out through legal 
channels. 
It seems that the turning point--if, indeed, there is 
such a point--in Virginia's reaction to the Bxovm decision 
mu.st lie with the appointment of the Commission of Public 
Education, commonly ref erred to as the Gray Commission. Until 
the appointment of this agency the voices of reaction were 
tempered by those of moderation. By appointing the Commission, 
the Governor had created an official forum for debate of the 
question; and the more extreme opinions began to gain wider 
acceptance. 
The Gray Commission was appointed on August 30, 1954, to 
formulate a plan under which Virginia could meet the demands 
of the Supreme Court's decision.23 An outside observer might 
see this st~p. as a rational, sincere ~ffort to devise a policy 
for complying with the directive of the Court; but closer 
examination might have indicated otherwise. The chairman, 
State Senator Garland Gray of Waverly, represented a district 
of the Tidewater region of Virginia.24 A majority of the Commission 
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was taken from the other black-belt courj.ties of Southside and 
Tidewater Virginia.25 No Negro was included on the Commission. 
As the Gray Commission moved into action, it became clear that 
the intention was to compose a policy not of compliance but 
rather one of resistance to the Supreme Court's decision. 
With the perspective of twelve years one might easily 
draw such conclusions, but in 1954 perhaps logic aalled for 
taking such an important commission from the rural areas. One 
should remember that the Supreme Court had not yet announced 
its decision in Baker Y.!. Carr,26 the decision which ended rural 
domination of legislatures by requiring greater representation 
for urgan areas in both houses. Consequently the political 
leadership of the Commonwealth resided not in Richmond nor 
Norfolk but more often that not in obscure places like Win-
chester, Waverly, and Blackstone. Never since the days of 
Reconstruction had Virginia faced such a monumental problem 
or, as many Virginians saw it, threat. What was more reason-
able, then, than to turn to those currently in positions of co~~a~Ji°_j 
leadership for guidance? 
The men to whom the people entrusted Virginia's reception 
of the Brown case were all members of the General Assembly. 
Although the recommendations of the Commission were to lay the 
groundwork for the widely-acc~pted policy of massive resistance, 
the Commission was not greeted with universal acclaim. The 
NAACP feared that the Commission was designed to consider the 
abolishment of the public school system;2$ the Lynchburg News 
editorially questioned the wisdom of excluding Negroes from 
membership;~ and the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot criticized the 
___________ J 
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fact that no one other than male, white legislators was 
appointed.29 
But in its early weeks of planning, the Gray Commission 
was to be the object of even stronger attaeks from unexpected 
sources. On October 5, 1954, Senator Gray addressea a meeting 
of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, 
a pro-segregation organization centered for the most part in 
the Southside counties. J. Barrye Wall, editor of the Farmville 
Herald, and Robert B. Crawford, a Farmville civic leader, organized 
the Defenders. Farmville, the major town in the Southside 
county of Prince Edward, was to play a major role in succeeding 
events. In 1954 Prince Edward County's population was 44.6 
Negro, one of the larger Negro communities in Virginia.30 In 
later years Farmville became well-known for abolishing its 
public school system in the fa£e of integration, and Editor 
Wall was to play a major role in closing the schools there. 
In other southern states White Citizens' Councils, groups 
similar to the Defenders, were formed to combat integration.31 
$uch groups as these always opposed integration and often believed 
in a "conservative" approach to many other unrelated issues. 
In the course of his address to the Defenders, the Senator 
stated that he had no intention of seeing his grandchildren 
attend integrated schools and added further 
When I was appointed chairman of the Governor's 
legislative committee on segregation, I told that 
group I would act impartially and hear everything 
anyone wanted to say on this vital question. But 
I also said I have IIJT/Own personal convictions on 
the issue which I do not intend to sacrifice on the 
alter of political expediency.32 
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Although this statement was well-received by the Defenders, 
the Methodist Church in Virginia became alarmed and leveled 
severe criticism on the ~enator. The Methodists d.emanded that 
Virginians be entitled to an impartial, objective examination 
of the issua at hand and questioned the wisdom of Gray's selection: 
If this is a sample of the speeches the senator 
LGraiJ ~ntends to make prior to the hearing in 
November, it raises serious questions of his 
competence to serve on the COIIllilission in any 
capacity, whether as chairman or member.33 
On November 15, 1954, the Gray Commission held a public 
hearing at the Mosque, a public auditorium in Richmond, Over 
one hundred (100) persons testified before the Commission, 
and their testimony indicated a wide spectrum of thought. On 
the one hand some witnesses advocated closing the schools rather 
than integrating them while others called for sincere adherence 
to the Supreme Court's decree. The only open hearing on the 
subject was at the Mosque, for the Commission's other meetings 
were held in executive session. 
The Gray Commission worked a total of fourteen (14) 
months; and on November 11, 1955, Senator Gray presented its 
report to Governor Stanley. What the Commission presented was 
not a plan for acceptance of the Brown decision; it was not 
even a recommendation of means of compliance. It was instead 
a logical, legal plan for delaying implementation of the Court's 
decrees. 
Voluntary, rapid compliance with the Brown decision would 
have been nothing short of a miracle for Virginia,: Some of 
her most highly-respected citizens opposed integration in_ any 
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fashionr others urged slow, cautious compliance; and almost 
all of them felt that the issue was being forced on the South 
by "outsiders." Clifford Dowdy, a distinguished writer from 
Virginia, evaluated the southern reaction the year before. 
In his presentation Dowdy accused the Supreme Court of entering 
the legislative field and compared the Brown decision to the 
defeat of the southern states at Appomattox.34 He predicted 
that the South would attempt to avoid desegregation and argued 
that integration in the South presented unique problems not 
faced in other sections of the nation.35 A passage in his 
article fairly accurately sums up the attitude of the Gray 
Commission: "••owhite southerners accepted this legislation 
by the judiciary as something else dumped in their laps, as 
was the freed Negro, for them to deal with in their own way. 11 36 
So now the legislative committee presented its recommenda-
tions: amend Section 141 to allow tuition grants for use in 
private schools, establish a state fund for financing tuition 
grants, and delegate to localities the authority to assign 
pupils and teachers to different schools.37 The basic feature 
of the G.ray Plan, tuition grants, hinged on the amending of 
Section 141 which restricted the use of state funds to public 
schools and pupils in such schools only. 
In September, 1955, Attorney-General Almond filed a suit 
(Almond :!!.. Day) in the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to 
test the validity of tuition grants for use in private schools. 
Citing the provisions of Section 141 which provided that "No 
appropriation of public funds shall bejrnade to any school or 
institution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled 
by the State or some political division thereof; ••• 1138 Chief 
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Justice John W. Eggleston of the Court delivered the decision 
which· prohibited the use of tuition grants in private schools.39 
The Gray Commission, then, in order to secure the amendment 
to Section 141 asked the Governor .to summon a special session 
of the General Assembly and to present enabline legislation 
for the submission of the constitutional question to the 
people in a referendum.40 
In the proposed referendum the people would be asked to 
authorize the calling of a constitutional convention which 
would be empowered to amend Section 141 in order to legalize 
the use of tuition grants in private institutions. Perhaps 
a good indication of the eagerness with which state officials 
welcomed the report is the rapidity with which Governor Stanley 
responded to the request for a special session. He received 
the report on November 11, 1955; and he convened the special 
session on November 30e 
As the date for the special session approached, some 
legislators grew concerneafover the future of the public school 
system in general. They feared that a move was afoot to 
remove the Commonwealth's obligation to provide free, public 
education by amending Section 129 of the State Constitution. 
This section, the first of thiirteen (13) constitutional pro-
visions for public education, provided that "The General 
Assembly shall establish and maintain an efficient system of 
public free schools throughout the State. 1141 State Senator 
Ted Dalton, Republican senator for the white-belt area of 
Roanoke, announced his desire to preserve the provisions of 
this section; but the Senate refused to/~ifically its desire 
,------------------------- - -- - -- ------ - - --- -- - -- - ----- - ----- ---- -- ------1 
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to retain Section 129. Across the lobby on the House side 
of the capitol, Delegate Omer L. Hirst from Fairfax County 
and Falls Church, urged that tuition grants be used only in 
areas maintaining a system of public schools.42 His proposal 
was defeated by a voice vote in the House. 
In short, no modification of the bill presented by the 
Gray Commission was adopted. By a vote of 38 to 1, Dalton's 
vote being the only opposition, the Senate adopted the referen-
dum bill. The House of Delegates approved the bill by the 
overwhelming majority of 93 to 5.43 
A glance at the six (6) legislators in opposition indicates 
something of the geographical influences on the issue. Senator 
Dalton was from Roanoke, an industrial center in the western 
part of the state. His district had a low percentage of 
Negroes (15.9 per cent of the population)44 and often elected 
Republicans to office. In the House, four of the five opposing 
votes were cast by legislators from northern Virginia's tenth 
district. One of them, Delegate Kathryn H. Stone, accused 
state officials of plotting the proposed action months before. 
She levelled the charge that Almond Y.!_ Day had been "plainly 
a handle to clear the way for private tuition grants. 1145 
Delegate Stuart B. Carter from Botetourt (10.1 per cent Negro 
population)46 and Craig Counties (.5 per cent Negro popula-
tion)47 cast the remaining 11no" vote.48 
Popular concern over the fate of education in the Common-
weal th was also evident. Many persons felt that Attorney-
General Almond's statement to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
April, 1955, was on the verge of being adopted by the legis-
,---------------------------------------------
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lature. Almond had said, "We are facing ••• possible destruction 
of the free public-school system. 1149 The legislature's 
ref'usal to specifically protect Section 129 from consideration 
by the proposed convention did nothing to dispel this fear. 
In December, 1955, ten (10) of Virginia's eleven chapters of 
the Women's League of Voters adopted resolutions opposing 
the Gray Plan. They felt that the tuition grant proposal 
was unconstitutiona1.50 
Religious groups began to speak on the issue in various 
ways. The-Richmond Methodist Ministers' Conference adopted 
a resolution by a vote of 26 to 10 which stated that "segre-
gation as now practiced is neither constitutional, democratic, 
nor Christian. 11 51 The Norfolk Ministers Association, the 
Harrisonburg Ministerial Association, the Virginia Council 
of United Church Women, and several other religious bodies 
added their disapproval to the growing discussion of the 
Gray proposals.52 
Virginia's public school teachers also expressed their 
concern over the issue. The Virginia Education Association 
announced its fear that damage to public education would 
result from forced integration.53 The teachers never advocated 
closing public schools and as a whole opposed any moves in 
that direction, although they never officially commented on 
the modification of Section 14<l.54 Their unwillingness to 
close the schools is understandable, since closed schools 
meant fewer positions for educators. 
Even though the peopie were given the opportunity to 
L___ 
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express themselves on amending the constitution (and in 
doing so to pass indirect judgement on the Gray Plan), the 
state officials did not remain neutral on the issue. The 
State Heferendum Information Center was established as an 
official agency, and Governor Stanley appointed Dr. Dabney 
S. Lancaster to coordinate the Center's work.55 
Many prominent Virginians supported calling the con-
vention, and the Information Center used their voices to a 
great extent. Former Governor John s. Battle agreed with 
U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, the acknowledged patriarch of 
Virginia politics, in urging the adoption of the proposal. 
U.S. Senator A. Willis Robertson on December 19 announced 
that the s.tate had no choice " ••• save to take the middle-
of-the-road course urged by the Gray Commiasion--a course 
in which the convention is the first step. 11 56 
Dr. Howard and Former Governor Colgate Darden, then 
president of the University of Virginia, supported the pro-
posed amendment provided that Section 129 remain in force. 
Parke C. Brinkley, state commissioner of agriculture, urged 
city-dwellers to vote for the convention and in doing so to 
aid the rural areas of the Commonwealth.57 Many agricultural 
organizations such as the Virginia Farmers' Union called for 
the change in Section 14.1. 
The Information Center, however, was not the only organi-
zation in the campaign. A group of well-known citizens organized 
the Virginia Society for Preservation of Public Education 
(VSPPE) in December, 1955, with Delegate Armistead Boothe 
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as chairman and Delegate Kathryn H. Stone as co-ordinator. 
The VSPPE called tuition gants illegal, unconstitutional, and 
unworkable and charged that the tuition grant plan would allow 
the wealthy to attend private, segregated schools while forcing 
the poor to attend integrated public schools.58 
On ~anuary 5, 1956, only three days before the referen-
dum, Governor Stanley addressed the electors on statewide 
radio. In the speech he equated a vote against the proposed 
amendment as a vote for integrated schools.59 State Senator 
Dalton replied with an ominous warning that adoption of the 
proposal would take Virginia into "a futile plan that may 
not stand the test of legality. 11 60 The next day the Henrico 
County Classroom Teachers' Association by a vote of 26 to 2 
supported the proposal for amending the constitution.61 The 
ease with which public school teachers could be discharged 
during the period helps to explain the minute minority on the 
vote. 
All efforts to keep Section 141 intact fail~d. By a 
margin of 157,990 the voters called for a convention, and in 
doing so they assured the amending of Section 1410 The work 
of the Information Center had been successful, and the first 
major step toward massive resistance had been taken. 
Delegates to the convention were chosen on February 21, 
1956, in a general election; and the majority of the dele-
gates had favored the amendment in their campaigns. On March 7 
the convention amended Section 142 as expected and thus 
made tuition grants legal in Virginia. 
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In the course of its debate, however, the convention 
was not of one mind. H.D. Dawbarn from the twenty-second 
district62 charged that the Gray Report favored the South-
side and Tidewater situations while ignoring the problems 
confronting other sections of the Commonwealth. He promised 
to support a plan of local option in the use of tuition grants,q~ 
but Attorney-General Almond arbitrarily ruled the considera-
tion of Dawbarn's plan by the convention out of order under 
the legislative act which called the convention into session. 
Perhaps the most sensational development in the conven-
tion was the introduction of a resolution by Blackstone's 
J. 3egar Gravatt. This resolution commended the General 
Assembly for having entered a "contest of power" with the 
U.S. Supreme Court over the Brown decision.64 B9 a :e~e ~ 
3i iie- 3 t'tlP eenveniiieR a;;;p bi the :!leaelui;i Oillii; 'f11hiefi ;:as e. 
l' I I I I ] 11e !lre 1 :cle 1 me"S +'teWilWltJ inLw11 Jiiri:n. Through-
out the convention's meetings there was never any doubt that 
Section 14;1 would be amended. The convention remained united, 
as a whole, against any proposal other than that submitted 
by the Gray Commission. 
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Chapter 2. 
Interposition--A Ghost of the Past 
- ------
The policy which Virginia had finally chosen reached its 
peak on February 1, 1956, when the General Assembly adopted 
the famous Resolution of Interposition. This act of the 
legislature culminated three months of a determined effort 
by several Virginians to invoke a modern application of the 
historic doctrine which John C. Calhoun had termed "the funda-
mental principle of our system [Of governmeng 1165 
During the administration of John Adams, Congress passed 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, a series of measures which restricted 
freedom of speech and tended to stifle opposition to the 
Federalist administration. Several states opposed the acts, 
but Virginia and ~entuck:y were especially displeased. In 
1798 Virginia ninterposed" her sovereignty and declared the 
acts unconstitutional through the adoption of a resolution 
written by James Madison. In 1798 and 1799 Kentucky adopted 
her interposition resolutions which were composed by Jefferson, 
and declared the Alien and Sedition Acts void in that state. 
Although Virginia and Kentucky both adopted the Resolu-
tions, other states failed to follow their lead; and consequently 
there was never a direct confrontation between state and 
federal authority. In 1800 the Alien and Sedition Acts 
expired and were not re-enact·ed. Thus the only purpose served 
by asserting a state's right to interpose her sovereignty 
against federal authority was to give Virginia and Kentucky 
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an opportunity to state their positions dramatically. The 
question was never considered in cou:rt, and with the expiration 
of the Alien and Sedition.,Acts in 1800 the issue became a 
moot point. 
These resolutions, however, announced a new concept in 
political theory. First, they stated that the Union was a 
voluntary compact of the states to which certain powers were 
delegated. .Furthermore, and most importantly, they held that 
the ultimate power to interpret the constitution rested not 
in the federal government but with the states themselves. 
No major interposition issue arose again until 1832 
with the nullification controversy. John c. Calhoun, the 
South's leading political theorist and Vice-President of the 
United States, developed an elaborate theory of the Union. 
The South Carolina Exposition, secretly written by Calhoun 
in 1828 to protest that the "Tariff of Abominations" was 
unconstitutional, argued that a state had the rieht to judee 
the constitutionality of an act of Congress.66 Calhoun was 
able to refer to Jefferson and Madison, supporters of the 
earlier Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, for support of 
his theory. The South Carolina General Assembly officially 
endorsed the Exposition in 1828 and used its arguments as 
the basis for actions of future years. 
In 1832 South Carolina declared that the tariff acts of 
1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional, and as a result "null, 
void, and no law, nor binding upon this State. ri67 The nulli-
fication convention, however, went a step further than had 
L -- - - -
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Virginia and Kentucky in 1798 by calling on the legislature 
to prevent enforcement of the law in that state. Finally, 
the convention threatened to take the Palmetto State out of 
the Union if the tariff laws were enforced.68 
President Andrew Jackson, believiilg:;that nullification 
was unjustified and illegal, asked Congress to proclaim the 
federal constitution and law supreme.69 Congress responded 
with the Foree,; Bill which authorized the use of rnili tary 
and naval units to enforce the tariff laws. After Jackson 
had taken steps to enforce the law, even in advance of the 
congressional authorization, efforts were made to reach a 
compromise on the issue. South Carolina repealed its nulli-
fication of the tariff iaws in 1833 with the adoption of a 
compromise tariff bill. 
Although the Nullification Controversy was the most 
dramatic example of interposition attempts in the United 
States (with the exception of the Civil War), it did not 
succeed in limiting federal authority. No other peaceful 
interposition attempt was to reach the magnitude of this, 
controversy; and, indeed, few other attempts were: made~. 
These ideas were to arise again in American history, and most 
of the issues sparking such discussions were to revolve around 
the "place" of the Negro in American life. 
In 1859 Wisconsin invoked an interposition measure to 
impede enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law by the courts.70 
'l't 
S • • • 1 th t • t th t t • rt) I J ~ ry 1nce c1v1 war was rea ening a a 1me, no aer=eus 
eo~~~~~a~ien between Wisconsin and the federal government 
arose. Interposition reached its logical conclusion with the 
secession of the southern states in 1860-1861. The resulting 
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Civil War settled the conflict between the state and federal 
governments for all practical purposes by laying to rest the 
"twin nightmares" of nullification and secession.71 By 
1865, then, the issue of interposition appeared to be dead, 
but Virginia was the first to revive it in 1956. 
Virginians learned of the interposition idea largely 
through the efforts of James J. Kilpatrick, Jr., the editor 
of Richmond's Nevw<s-Leader. So effective was his campaign to 
have Virginia "interpose" her sovereignty in the Brown decision 
that he has .been called the "'father' of modern interposition. 1172 
The News-Leader had earlier endorsed the Gray Commis-
sion's recommendations, but Kilpatrick felt the need to go 
a step further. This step was interposition.73 A pamphelt 
written in 1955 by William Old, an attorney in Richmond's 
neighboring Chesterfield County and later a judge in that 
county, apparently furnished the stimulus for Kilpatrick's 
subsequent campaign. 74 Kilpatrick' s fi.rst statement on the 
question came on November 21, 1955, in his lead editorialo 
Throughout the following weeks the News-Leader carried editori-
als and documents including writings of Calhoun in support 
of the interposition proposition. On November 29, the eve 
of the special session convened by the Governor to consider 
the Gray Re:port, the editor wrote "We believe the question 
can be answered in one way only. It is by pressing for adop-
tion of the Gray Commission's own program in Virginia; and 
beyond this, by saying to the Nation that Virginia's answer 
is.: Interposition, nowL"75 
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The special session did n®t consider this proposal, but 
Kilpatrick did not give up. He aimed his campaign for the 
regular session of January, 1956, only a month away. The 
only vocal journalistic protest to the Kilpatrick proposal 
came from the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot; but because of its 
limited circulation, it was no match for the News-Leader. 
Editorial pressure for the adoption of interposition 
as a state policy was effective among many citizens; but 
Governor Stanley remained non-committal. More direct pres-
sure, however, was being applied by other groups, and the 
Defenders were in the lead. On January 13, 1956, Robert 
Cr~wford, president of the Defenders, led a delegation in 
aupport of interposition to call on the Governor. Stanley 
gave no concrete opinion on the issue at that time.76 On 
January 24 the Governor with three other southern governors 
finally committed himself to the doctrine of interposition 
as. a means for resisting the Brown ruling. All four men--
South Carolina's Timmerman, Georgia's Griffin, Mississippi's 
Coleman, and Stanley of Virginia--were to sign interposition 
measures within a matter of weeks. 
The interposition resolution, knovm officially as Senate 
Joint Resolution 3 (1956), was adopted on February 1. Thirty-
five (35) of forty (40) Virginia state senators supported ~he 
interposition bill, and only seven of one hundred (100) 
delegates refused to support a similar measure in the House 
of Delegates. Every opponent of th;fneasure represented a 
"white-belt" constituency.77 
L __ --------
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Once the foundation for massive resistance had been 
laid, another special session of the General Assembily in 
September of 1956 would pass twenty-three (23) specific bills 
to declare Virginia's. position officially and openly.78 
But these measures were still in the planning stages during 
the interposition struggle. 
Interposition, the result of Kilpatrick's irresponsible 
and useless campaign, easily fitted into the plans of Senator 
Byrd. By his smooth handling of a well-oiled political 
machine, the. ·Senator led Virginia down a blind alley in her 
most serious problem since the Reconstruction. Just as. the 
logical end of interposition is secess,ion, so is interposition 
the result of mass,ive resistance when carried to its logical 
conclusion. The irony is that in 1956 the cart came before 
the horse in Virginia, for massive resistance was not born 
until late in that year. 
The interposition resolutions, as expected, caused national 
concern, not only on the state level but in national political 
circles as well. When President Eisenhower was asked to com-
ment on these expressions of state supremacy, he replied 
that he could "never abandon or refuse to carry out f_hii/ 
own duty" in the enforcement of federal law.79 The President 
stated clearly that the Court's decisions carried the force 
of law. It was evident, then, that the executive branch of 
the federal government felt duty-bound to support the judiciary. 
Although interposition in 1956 did not employ the direct 
use of state force against federal authority, it did bring 
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the states'-rights issue to a boil. Belatedly in 1960 the 
U.S. SuPreme Court made its first comment on the nebulous 
doctrine in a case brought before it from Louisiana. In a 
brief opinion the Court upheld a three-judge court's ruling 
that "'interposition is not a constitutional doctrine'" and 
concluded that the question was u!without substance.•u80 
If there had been any real question concerning interposition's 
value in 1956, the Supreme Court in 1960 answered it with 
finality. 
Virginia's resolution of interposition became nothing 
more than an expression of defiance. It had no force of 
law; it received no judicial notice. In short, the resolution, 
although full of Shakespeare's sound and fury, signified nothing 
in practicality. 
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Chapter .4. 
Conclusion 
After a few promising weeks of moderation in the summer 
of 1954, Virginia turned her back on a spirit of reluctant 
acceptance of what appeared inevitable and turned to a spirit 
of total defiance. Her progress toward massive resistance 
made its greatest advances during 1955 and early 1956. Dr. 
Howard had even advoBAted moderation in a brief paraeraph t/" 
of his annual report of 1954: "The issue Lfntegratio.!'17 must 
receive the calm, deliberate, forthright, and prayerful con-
siderations of all Virginians. With this ~.piri t the problems 
will be met and solved.81 The Virginia Education Association 
also called for calm leadership of both races.~L 
A year later, however, the Gray Plan was unveiled, and 
the first legislation dealing with the integration issue was 
adopted. At that point, however, massive resistance was still 
a maneuver for the future. The remainder of 1954 and 1955 
witnessed the formation of groups such as the Defenders and 
ideas such as massive resistance, but little action'j was 
taken. 
Then with the appointment of the Gray Commission, and 
more especially with the filing of its report to the Governor, 
Virginia's attitude seems to have changed. The Gray Plan 
did not compile a workable formula for compliance with the 
Hrown ruling. Indeed, it stated that "This Commission believes 
that separate facilities in our public schools are in the 
best interests of both races ••• and that compUlsory inteeration 
-25-
should be resisted by all proper means in our power. 1183 Here 
is the first serious proposal for massive resistance, but the 
legislature did not adopt the measures necessary to implement 
it as a policy until September of 1956. That there was a 
delay in Virginia's actions on this issue is undeniable. 
One obvious reason for the delay is found in the Brown 
decision itself. The Supreme Court, italnuld be remembered, 
had postponed publication of any decree of implementation 
until the states affected had presented their suggestions 
for methods of procedure. Virginia used this delay to pre-
pare her case and to await the secondary ruling. 
Another not-so-obvious cause for delay may have been the 
mood of the people. Many prominent citizens had called for 
moderationo Senator Dalton, for example, never changed his 
call for a middle-of-the-road approach; and one state legis-
lator, Senator Stuart B. Carter, even announced that he 
favored gradual but orderly integration.84 Clearly the more 
reactionary persons needed the time after the Brown ruling 
to "educate" the citizenry to the position of resistance. 
~ben the resistance measures came, moderate voices were seldom 
heard. These measures aided segregationists and forced moderates 
more., 
to beAsilent.85 
The personal role of Senator Harry F. Byrd in the inte-
gration controversy is obscure. One characteristic of his 
influence in Virginia politics.was the obscurity in which his 
will was carried out. On December 17, 1955, he endorsed the 
Gray Commission's recommendation for amending the state cons-
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titution, and soon thereafter other political leaders in the 
state followed suit. 
Senator Byrd's opposition to the Brown decision was 
bitter, and in his bitterness he lent a great influence to 
the movement of non-compliance not on~y in Virginia but 
throughout the South as wel1.86 Byrd's support of massive 
resistance was flatly declared on February 2, 1956, the day 
after Virginia "interposed" her authority in opposition to 
the S.upreme Court's decision. He quietly affirmed his position 
by saying "'it is our duty to resist illegal encroachment. 1187 
What the leaders of the Commonwealth hoped to gain by 
delaying the implementation of the Brown decree is not clear. 
The Supreme Court had ordered federal district courts to 
carry out then.decision, and President Eisenhower had announced 
his intention to enforce the law.88 No reasonable person 
could have believed that the decision could be totally ignored 
or flaunted. Perhaps Virginia's leaders felt a political 
necessity to protest the Brown rulingo If this were the case, 
their objections were not so reactionary nor yet so mild as 
they might have been. They may have desired the time to 
establish more private schools, but few were established until 
after 1956. 
Massive resistance, interpostion, and all the rest of 
the segregationist measures adopted in Virginia were mere 
exercises in futility. Governor Stanley's authoritative 
statement "I shall use every legal means at my command to 
continue segregated schools •••• "89 served only to arouse 
Virginia to a hopeless and useless resistance. 
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In all their statements proclaiming the intention to 
resist integration, however, Virginia's leaders were careful 
to remain within the law. Governor Stanley had stressed 
"legal means" to continue segregation,90 Byrd had urged 
resistance to "illegal encroachments, 11 91 and the Gray Commis-
sion hE¥i recommended resistance "by all proper means. 11 92 
Attorney-General Almond even recognized the authority of 
the federal dictum on segregation by asserting that the 
Brown decision was still binding on Virginia even in the wake 
of interposition.93 
Some authorities have implied to some degree that had 
Virginia's leaders stayed on the road of moderation, integra-
tion would have been easier for the South to accept. Out-
side observers crrticized Virginia by saying that the "ruling 
political organization" in the Cormnonwealth could have avoided 
mass.ive resistanceo94 This idea must be rejected. Certainly 
Vi~ginia could have made it easier on the South had she been 
able to accept a moderate course, but this route was not open 
to her leaders. Throughout the massive resistance movement 
Virginia's leaders remained rather moderate in their applica-
tion of th~olicy. 'While castigating certain parts of the 
law, they were careful to remain within its bounds. T.here 
were no governors at the school-house door in Virginia to defy 
the federal authorities. Editor Kilpatrick had defended the 
wisdom of quiet opposition by writing that for Virginia to 
"defy the Court openly fjy italics?would be to enter upon 
anarchy !'9 5 
Parts of Virginia, the Tidewater and Southside especially, 
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were emotionally aroused by the Brown decision. These areas 
had always thought of the Negro as the domestic servant or 
farm hand, and many persons would not agree to a change in 
his situation. The wel?l-educated, more responsible members 
of the Negro community were rarely found in these areas of 
Virginia. Southside counties and Tidewater leadership guided 
the Commonwealth along the course of massive resistance; and 
no one was able to alter that course effectively. 
Virginia certainly viewed the entire integration issue 
as yet another battle to fight with the North. A state in 
which the Civil War still lives in many ways, Virginia reacted 
as if another Reconstruction period were being imposed upon 
her. 96 The G.ray Report had referred to this awareness of 
the past by declaring that "The public schools have been 
built up slowly and pa:Lilfully from the ashes of 1865. 1197 One 
hundred years later the Old Dominion provided leadership 
for the South in yet another crisis involving the Negro, but 
in~1954 this leadership was not thrust upon her by the actions 
of a sister state. It was, rather, carefully and deliberately 
assumed. Virginia, historically,a far-sighted national leader, 
in 1954 deserted reason for emotion. 
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